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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to apply a graphics processing unit (GPU) forensics method
to recover video artifacts from NVIDIA GPU. The tested video specs are 512 x 512 in
resolution for video 1 and 800 x 600 in resolution for video 2. Both videos are mpeg4 video
codec. A VLC player was used in the experiment. A special program has been developed
using OpenCL to recover 1) patterns that are frames consist of pixel values and 2) dump
data from the GPU global memory. The dump data that represent the video frame were
located using simple steps. The recovery process was successful. For 512 x 512 resolution
video, the frames were partially recovered but it shows enough information for the forensics
investigator to determine what was viewed last. The research indicates that it is harder, but
not impossible, to obtain a viewable frame from higher-resolution video
Keywords: Forensics, GPU forensics, Video forensics, OpenCL, NVIDIA GPU, Global
memory
1. INTRODUCTION
Video forensics has not been addressed
widely due to the difficulty of the pro-
cess. Considering how complicated the GPU
structure and the volatility of the data, the
process of recovering the evidence is chal-
lenging. One aspect of video forensics in-
volves analyzing, measuring, and compar-
ing video scientifically as part of a crim-
inal investigation. With the introduction
of advanced media players, face-recognition
software, and biometric-face matching tech-
nology, video forensics has been moved a
notch higher. Reyes et al. indicates that
live forensics is essential nowadays especially
with the evolution of technology (Reyes,
Steele, O’Shea, & Brittson, 2007). As it
is a common practice by law enforcements
to pull the plug the amount of information
lost there is unbearable (Reyes et al., 2007).
Live forensics will provide more information
to discover how, when, and who did what
in a criminal event, especially when han-
dling volatile data (Rogers, Goldman, Mis-
lan, Wedge, & Debrota, 2006; Hale Ligh,
2014). Rogers et al. introduced an on-site
forensics model that allows investigators to
identify, analyze, and interpret digital ev-
idence without the need to go to the lab
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for more inspection (Rogers et al., 2006).
The Rogers forensics model involves practic-
ing live forensics on volatile memory (RAM),
which has been used by law enforcement for
many years. The technique introduced in
this research is limited to video forensics
and involves live forensics on GPU volatile
memory. To the best of the author’s knowl-
edge, this is the first GPU live forensics tech-
nique that harvests the information directly
from the GPU memory. The amount of in-
formation stored in a GPU is massive and
could benefit the forensics field from many
aspects. This research is significant because
the method presented can be applied on a
real-case scenario if the video player used is
a VLC player and the computer is still pow-
ered on when investigators arrive. The tech-
nique presented will allow the forensics inves-
tigator to recover the last video frame seen
by the user by using patterns that are gen-
erated from the suspect machine. NVIDIA
GTX560M was used for the test along with a
340.43 driver. Recovery from 512 x 512 video
was successful, but the results from 800 x 600
video were not as encouraging because only
a limited number of patterns could be gener-
ated. However, this issue may be addressed
by generating more patterns, thereby in-
creasing the chance of having viewable video
frames. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 discusses previous work
related to the topic. Section 3 discusses the
recovery process of the video frames. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the results of the research.
Section 5 discusses future research and offers
a conclusion.
2. RELATED WORK
Zhang attempted to discover a forensically
sound method to recover data about an im-
age from an NVIDIA GPU by creating soft-
ware to run several tests to request and
store information directly from the GPU
(Y. Zhang & Yang, 2015). The first test
checked the availability of such information.
The second one checked its integrity. The
third locates the test image data and ex-
tracts it from GPU memory. The recovery
process was divided into three sections: re-
covery of color data, validating color data
against the original, and testing whether
such a procedure could be used in different
environments (Y. Zhang & Yang, 2015).
The results of Zhang study shows that it is
possible to locate and access information on
GPU memory on full volume without dam-
aging it. The examiner can even replicate
the data pattern. However, a certain number
of such patterns need to be recovered before
it is possible to reconstruct the image. The
forensic soundness of such a method was not
proved because the examiner was not able
to repeat the results on the same image be-
cause of the way the data is stored in GPU.
Nonetheless, a new test called Color Depth
Map was used in the process in order to re-
store the data from GPU by creating a num-
ber of image data conversion matrices. Ac-
cording to Zhang that the method presented
in the study cannot yet be called forensi-
cally sound because the data in the GPU
memory is not directly linked to the origi-
nal image but instead it represents the im-
age that will be shown on the monitor. How-
ever, this is not the case for video files. In
the end, Zhang hopes that with some mod-
ification, this new test will be able to be-
come forensically sound or at least be able
to guide the research in the right direction.
The research is extremely important because
of the absence of reliable forensic methods of
retrieving and researching data from GPU
(Y. Zhang & Yang, 2015).
During court cases, digital videos form a
very important part of the evidence. Assess-
ment of the accuracy of these digital videos
helps in deciding whether the videos are au-
thentic and can be used as evidence. Tamer
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Shanableh focused his study on how much a
court can rely on the digital videos as evi-
dence and how to detect whether the video
was tampered with. Shanableh found that
machine learning technique (MLT) is reli-
able and is being used all over the world
to determine if a digital video was altered
(Shanableh, 2013). Shanableh concluded
that these machine learning techniques are
viable and feasible to detect if the video
was tampered with and are forged irrespec-
tive of the fact that how many frames were
deleted. The restraining fact was that it
should not be a multiple of length of the
group of the pictures. The technique was
trained and laden with both forged and un-
altered video samples. Shanableh used three
different MLTs to show that the results gen-
erated are authentic and accurate. The three
techniques that were used included KNN (or
K Nearest Neighbor), Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM), and logistic regression tech-
nique (Shanableh, 2013). The author af-
firmed that the technique is extremely re-
liable in detecting forged videos and helping
the court in deciding the validity and accu-
racy of the digital videos (Shanableh, 2013).
Van Houten and Geradts discussed a new
method that can be used to determine the
source of a video, such as videos uploaded
on YouTube. Determining the source of a
video is becoming increasingly necessary, es-
pecially if the case is about child pornogra-
phy or abuse (Van Houten & Geradts, 2009).
People use the Internet to propagate their
ideas, and in some cases people such as pe-
dophiles may upload illegal images over the
Internet. Therefore, tracing videos back to
a source is important, especially for law en-
forcers (Van Houten & Geradts, 2009).
Currently, device identification is achieved
by extracting undetectable sensor pattern
noise from image residues of the image sen-
sor in the image structure. The sensors act
as unique signatures and each device has its
own unique pattern; therefore, the pattern
can be compared with the source camera
even in a database. When two or more pat-
terns are similar, it indicates that both im-
ages could have the same origin. Van Houten
and Geradts therefore suggested that it is
necessary to create a database of images,
such as images of child pornography, that
can be linked together to find a perpetrator
(Van Houten & Geradts, 2009). The source
of these videos can also be determined from
YouTube, which, after compression, lowers
the level of noise (Van Houten & Geradts,
2009). However, this method has some lim-
itations. Changing the aspect ratio or resiz-
ing negatively affects the sensor noise, which
may lead to erroneous identification of the
source device. Furthermore, it is impossible
to tell the initial codec setting or resolution
in which a video was uploaded. Finally, as
manufacturing standards improve, the pat-
tern noise will likely decrease. In addition,
YouTube and other cloud platforms keep up-
grading their websites, which may in turn
alter the settings of a video. Still, while the
method is not perfect, it can be used to solve
many crimes and stop illegal activity, such as
child pornography (Van Houten & Geradts,
2009).
Milani et al. discussed the strengths and
weaknesses of several video forensic tech-
niques (Milani et al., 2012). Video forensics
can use several techniques to authenticate
the originality of a video, including video
sharpening, video stabilization, masking, in-
terlacing, and demultiplexing. Milani et al.
also discussed camera artifacts, image com-
pression, and geometric/physics inconsisten-
cies (Milani et al., 2012). These methods
have existed for a long time and can be con-
sidered basic methodologies for establishing
authenticity. But Milani et al. also discussed
the methodologies of signal analysis, includ-
ing ballistic fingerprinting, detection of reac-
quisition, and detection of copying (Milani et
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al., 2012).
Milani et al. provided an overview of
the tools used for video compression, net-
work footprint identification and video com-
pression anti-forensics (Milani et al., 2012).
When it comes to video forensic techniques,
inter-frame analysis is an important tech-
nique used extensively. Because a video is
composed of multiple frames, there is always
a possibility to insert, delete, and dupli-
cate frames, thereby modifying the content.
Thus, effective techniques should be devel-
oped to identify these forgeries. The authors
also mentioned aspects of video forensics,
such as block detection, quantization step
detection, and identification of motion vec-
tors. Videos can also be forged during trans-
mission. To detect such actions, footprint
identification is used (Milani et al., 2012).
According to Gironi et al., a digital video
(DV) is a series of motionless images shot
at an adequately high rate (Gironi, Fontani,
Bianchi, Piva, & Barni, 2014). The re-
sulting signal may be compressed by low-
ering the temporal and spatial redundancy
through the use of video coding algorithms
such as H.264 and MPEG-2 (Gironi et al.,
2014). These algorithms utilize a block-
oriented combination video coding technique
and split images into varying kinds, such
as intra-coded images or I-frames, as well
as predictive-coded images referred to as B-
frames and P-frames (Gironi et al., 2014).
DVs are utilized for security reasons be-
cause of their higher reliability as evidence
compared to still pictures. It is much harder
to forge a video than a picture, although
it is still possible to tamper with a video
through the insertion, deletion, or duplica-
tion of frames, which may make the video
worthless (Gironi et al., 2014).
The goal of video forensics is to analyze
the procedural history of a digital video,
which is generally stored in a compressed for-
mat. Thus, multiple techniques have been
developed to ascertain whether a DV has
been encoded more than once, which may
indicate forgery in some cases. Additionally,
video forensics examines the integrity of dig-
ital videos by attempting to disclose manip-
ulations such as inter-frame and intra-frame
forgeries (Gironi et al., 2014).
One method of detecting video forgery de-
pends on the fact that a double compression
suggests a forgery where the first compres-
sion occurred while attaining the video and
the second compression occurred after ma-
nipulation. Thus, the double encoding de-
tection technique involves alterations to the
video, making it robust to frame elimination
between the pair of encodings. Afterwards,
an algorithm is developed to repeatedly uti-
lize this technique to monitor whether a mis-
alignment exists in the frame setup between
the pair of encodings. If there is a misalign-
ment, the next step involves locating its posi-
tion and grouping the attack as either frame
insertion or elimination (Gironi et al., 2014).
Bress, Kiltz, and Schaler carried out
a study to investigate the key challenges
as well as countermeasures associated with
forensics on GPU coprocessing in databases
(Sebastian Bress, 2013). The research also
provides an analysis of how data can be re-
trieved from the GPU RAM. In earlier stud-
ies, this was achieved by utilizing other pro-
cesses whereby the memory dump of a device
memory would be created. This provided
a gap for bypassing the access controls of
the database management systems (DBMS)
(Sebastian Bress, 2013).
According to Bress, Kiltz, and Schaler,
one of the key challenges in GPU coprocess-
ing in databases is that access restriction
makes it difficult to carry out forensic in-
vestigations. In addition, the authors indi-
cates that direct access to GPU may cause
security issues. Another challenge is the
closed nature of the application program-
ming interface APIs, which limit access con-
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trol (Sebastian Bress, 2013). Bress, Kiltz,
and Schaler opine that there is a need to
conduct forensic inspections of GPUs so that
information systems processing confidental
data can take advantage from the GPU ac-
celeration. The key challenges for secure co-
processing that can result from bypassing
the access controls of the DBMS include the
loss of confidentiality, violation of data in-
tegrity, as well as availability. Furthermore,
it also leads to non-repudiation and lack of
authenticity. In addition, GPU coprocess-
ing on databases also presents major chal-
lenges when it comes to forensics. These
challenges come in the form of the lack of ap-
propriate approaches to conduct data recov-
ery, memory interpretation, and the recon-
struction of program flow (Sebastian Bress,
2013). To obtain a memory dump from the
GPU, Bress, Kiltz, and Schaler executed a
program that writes a fixed string specified
by the user to the GPU RAM, which is fol-
lowed by memory allocation after the initial
step is terminated. The allocated memory
is then copied from the GPU RAM to the
CPU RAM, which creates a data and mem-
ory dump (Sebastian Bress, 2013).
Albabtain and Yang introduced a method
that recovers images and web-pages from
the GPU global memory using OpenCL
(Albabtain & Yang, 2017). The authors in-
dicated that the recovery process is not pos-
sible without cleaning the GPU global mem-
ory first which is a huge hurdle when it comes
to forensics, as this step will alter the origi-
nal data and therefore become dismissed in
court(Albabtain & Yang, 2017).
Most authors used the GPU to acceler-
ate or enhance the forensics process but
very few used forensics to extract evidence
from the GPU. Considering the fact that
the GPU holds vital information stored in
the volatile memory and the fact that the
chip is programmable, it is important to de-
velop a method that extracts these informa-
tion. Law enforcement officers can benefit
from such information because it can help
in solving cases especially child pornography
cases.
3. EXPERIMENT
This experiment was conducted in an unal-
tered setup to bring it closer to reality. The
GPU model used in this test is GTX560M
with driver number 340.43. The test con-
sisted of three main stages:
The process starts with viewing the video
using VLC player then collecting evidence
using OpenCL. Once the evidence is secured,
then the second stage starts by generating
patterns from the same machine. The pro-
cess of generating patterns can be repeated
to recover as much patterns as possible, be-
cause this will increase the chances of having
a better clear picture of the recovered frame
(Albabtain & Yang, 2017).
3.1 Stage one (preparing the
evidence):
Multiple videos were prepared for the test.
Each video had different specs.
1. Video 1: A 512 x 512 resolution video
with mpeg4 codec of NVIDIA CEO
Jensen Huang presenting at an NVIDIA
conference.
2. Video 2: An 800 x 600 resolution video
with mpeg4 codec of NVIDIA CEO
Jensen Huang presenting at an NVIDIA
conference.
Both videos were viewed using a VLC
player, which is a well-known media player in
the market. Stage one involved simply open-
ing the video file for a few seconds, then clos-
ing the program. After that, the author col-
lected the dump data from the GPU global
memory. The author used a specially devel-
oped OpenCL code that extracts the dump
c© 2018 ADFSL Page 75
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 Live GPU forensics: the process of recovering ...
Figure 1. Video frame recovery roadmap.
data from the GPU global memory. The
structure of the GPU dump data has been
studied thoroughly, and the hex file consists
of six main parts. Parts one through five
hold parts of the last viewed frame, but the
sixth part of the hex file holds the full frame
that was displayed. To locate the sixth part
in the hex file, the following steps must be
followed:
• Because the used application is a VLC
player, there is a unique Hexadecimal
value that represents the start of the
VLC dump data.
• For this experiment, the start of the
frame corresponded with 13A20000 off-
set. The hexadecimal values in that off-
set are: ”10 10 10 00 10 10 10 00 10
10 10 00 10 10 10 00” which represents
the start of the VLC video player data.
This represents part one, which holds a
partial frame and is not important, al-
though it does help in locating the full
frame which is located in part six, which
is in this case, the offset 13F20000.
• Copy the data starting from 13F20000
to the end of the dump file and paste it
in a new document. These data repre-
sent the last viewed frame.
Once the data have been obtained, the in-
vestigator now can generate patterns that
will help reconstruct the recovered frame to
a viewable image.
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Figure 2. The beginning of the dump data
that represent the video frame .
3.2 Stage two (generating
patterns):
A 512 x 512 and an 800 x 600 color map pat-
tern were created using Adobe Photoshop.
Zhang used the color map pattern method
to establish a correlation between pixels used
for evidence and those in the original image
(Y. Zhang & Yang, 2015). As a result of
the test, it will be possible to reconstruct
the original image using the data that were
stored in an array. Colors in the array were
stored as decimal values of RGB colors. Us-
Figure 3. GPU global memory dump file
structure .
ing the same sequence to restore the colors
to the same places to create an image means
that there is a certain pattern by which col-
ors are written into dump memory (Y. Zhang
& Yang, 2015). The researcher used RGB
mode because it represents the three colors
that an average monitor uses to create all
other colors from color palette.(Q. Zhang &
Xiao, 2014) Eight initial images were used
to represent all possible interactions of these
three colors. This test was used to test
the hypothesis that it is possible to create a
forensically sound method of extracting in-
formation from GPU in an undamaged and
unaltered state. Even though the hypothesis
was not proved, Color Map Pattern tests re-
vealed a clear correlation between evidence
and the original data. The author managed
to successfully map and extract data and
reproduce it; however, it was not an exact
copy of the original because the color pat-
tern was not the only data that were writ-
ten to memory about the image. In stage
two, the author used the same computer and
the same GPU GTX 560M to generate pat-
terns and save them in an attempt to recon-
struct the frame recovered from stage one
to a viewable status that could help foren-
sic investigators. A total of 11 patterns were
generated by cleaning the GPU global mem-
ory using OpenCL, then opening and clos-
ing the color map image presented in figure
4 using Windows photo viewer, and then ob-
Figure 4. 512 x 512 and an 800 x 600 Color
map patterns.
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taining the dump data from the GPU using
OpenCL. The functions used to obtain the
dump data are clEnqueueReadBuffer and
clCreateBuffer. The process was repeated in
the hope of generating more unique patterns.
3.3 Stage three(recover the
evidence):
In this final stage, the generated patterns
were used to reconstruct the frame to its
original shape (or close enough for foren-
sics investigators). The patterns consisted of
pixels, and each pixel holds a pixel ID. The
program mapped the recovered frame to its
original shape using the pixel values stored
in these patterns.
4. RESULTS
The original frame to be recovered is shown
in figure 5. The video has been opened using
a VLC player for three seconds.
A total of 11 patterns were recovered after
obtaining the evidence dump data. The pro-
cess of generating patterns and recovering
the evidence took 3.8 minutes. The results
showed what was viewed last using the VLC
player, which was a clip of NVIDIA CEO
Jensen Huang presenting at an NVIDIA con-
ference. Some patterns were not clear, but
combining the results of the 11 patterns
helped the investigator see what was viewed
last.
The original 800 x 600 video frame is
Figure 5. 512 x 512 original video frame.
Figure 6. 512x512 recovered evidence.
shown above. Because of the increase in the
resolution, the author increased the number
of generated patterns to 14.
The results of the 800 x 600 video frame
is not as encouraging as the 512 x 512 res-
olution. The recovery process took 4.9 min-
utes, almost 20 seconds per image. The
results indicate that many more patterns
have to be generated in order to reconstruct
the frame to a viewable status. In general,
video frames can be recovered from the GPU
global memory even in a real-case scenario,
but certain conditions have to be met:
• The suspect must use VLC player.
• The computer is still powered on to per-
form live forensics.
• Video resolution must be known, which
is not a problem in most cases consid-
ering the computer is in the authorities’
hands.
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Figure 7. 800 x 600 original video frame.
Figure 8. 800x600 recovered evidence.
Certainly, there are some drawbacks for
this technique, such as these:
• Running the OpenCL code on the sus-
pect computer to obtain data from the
GPU global memory will update the
system’s time stamp.
• Video resolution must be known to gen-
erate the correct patterns for recon-
structing the frame to a viewable status.
• Only the last processed frame can be
recovered.
5. CONCLUSION
In this technologically advanced world, data
plays a significant role in everyone’s life. The
GPU holds rich data for the forensics inves-
tigator. Access to these information will cer-
tainly help in solving cases. This research is
a step forward to reach that goal. Accord-
ing to Rogers et al., live forensics has been
applied by law enforcement as some cases
are extremely time sensitive (Rogers et al.,
2006). It can be concluded that the higher
the video resolution, the more patterns need
to be created. In the 512 x 512 resolution
video, the results were enough with 11 pat-
terns; but for the 800 x 600 video, the results
were not satisfying even with 14 patterns.
Also, although it is not impossible to recover
video frames from the GPU global memory,
data volatility can make the process impossi-
ble. For instance, if the computer is powered
off, data cannot be obtained.
5.1 Future work
For further study, testing different GPUs will
certainly add more knowledge to this field
and will help investigators understand the
limitations. The fact that video resolution
must be known to recover the frame is an
obstacle that can be overcome, especially if
the need is to recover a viewable frame and
not a fully recovered frame. Also, it is impor-
tant to note that this research is not limited
to VLC player only. VLC player we chosen
to the fact that it is a popular video player.
Considering testing other video players will
help understand how exactly GPU handles
video data, which ultimately will improve
this research. Another issue to this research
is the data integrity, perhaps creating an-
other level of security by hashing the data
or any other method is important to preserve
the integrity of the recovered data. Incorpo-
rating machine learning to digital forensics is
certainly an interesting approach. Bhatt and
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H. Rughani introduced a new approach by
adding forensic analysis to a machine learn-
ing open source program called “DeepQA”
(Bhatt & H. Rughani, 2017).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research is supported by King Faisal
Specialist Hospital and Research Center
KFSH&RC and Intel Grant No. 301620
REFERENCES
Albabtain, Y., & Yang, B. (2017). GPU
FORENSICS: RECOVERING
ARTIFACTS FROM THE GPUS
GLOBAL MEMORY USING
OPENCL. Retrieved from
https://www.academia.edu/
35497121/GPU FORENSICS
RECOVERING ARTIFACTS FROM THE
GPUS GLOBAL MEMORY USING OPENCL
Bhatt, P., & H. Rughani, P. (2017).
Machine learning forensics:a new
branch of digital forensics. Retrieved
from http://www.ijarcs.info/
index.php/Ijarcs/article/
download/4613/4155
Gironi, A., Fontani, M., Bianchi, T., Piva,
A., & Barni, M. (2014). A video
forensic technique for detecting frame
deletion and insertion - ieee
conference publication. Retrieved
from http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
document/6854801/
Hale Ligh, C. A. L. J. . W. A., M. (2014).
The art of memory forensics:
Detecting malware and threats in
windows, linux, and mac memory.
Retrieved from
http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/
WileyTitle/
productCd-1118825098.html
Milani, S., Fontani, M., Bestagini, P.,
Barni, M., Piva, A., Tagliasacchi, M.,
& Tubaro, S. (2012). An overview on
video forensics. Retrieved from
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
document/6334348/
Reyes, A., Steele, J., O’Shea, K., &
Brittson, R. (2007). Cyber crime
investigations - 1st edition. Retrieved
from
https://www.elsevier.com/books/
cyber-crime-investigations/
reyes/978-1-59749-133-4
Rogers, M., Goldman, J., Mislan, R.,
Wedge, T., & Debrota, S. (2006).
Computer forensics field triage
process model. The Journal of Digital
Forensics, Security and Law . doi:
10.15394/jdfsl.2006.1004
Sebastian Bress, M. S. (2013). Forensics on
gpu coprocessing in databases
-research challenges, first
experiments, and countermeasures.
Retrieved from http://
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
summary?doi=10.1.1.382.9573.
Shanableh, T. (2013). Detection of frame
deletion for digital video forensics.
Retrieved from https://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S1742287613001102
Van Houten, W., & Geradts, Z. (2009).
Source video camera identification for
multiply compressed videos
originating from youtube. Digital
Investigation, 6 (1-2), 48-60. doi:
10.1016/j.diin.2009.05.003
Zhang, Q., & Xiao, C. (2014). Cloud
detection of rgb color aerial
photographs by progressive
refinement scheme. IEEE
Transactions on Geoscience and
Remote Sensing , 52 (11), 7264-7275.
doi: 10.1109/tgrs.2014.2310240
Zhang, Y., & Yang, B. (2015). Recovering
Page 80 c© 2018 ADFSL
Live GPU forensics: the process of recovering ... CDFSL Proceedings 2018
image data from a gpu using a
forensic sound method.
c© 2018 ADFSL Page 81
CDFSL Proceedings 2018 Live GPU forensics: the process of recovering ...
Page 82 c© 2018 ADFSL
